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Abstract
We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an
agent’s corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector
such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor. The principal’s ob-
jective is to minimize the overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and
social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing
supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage
in monetary side-transfers, the principal may stand to beneﬁt by allowing
supervisor-agent collusion. This beneﬁt may even prompt the principal to
actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict pref-
erence over an honest supervisor. JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: K42, D73,
D78.
Key Words: Corruption, monitoring, collusion, bounty hunter mechanism.
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Bribes are rarely entirely detected by internal control mechanisms of government
oﬃces. Often they remain hidden until, if ever, a whistle is blown by outside
detectors such as the media. Detection of corruption mainly by outside sources
suggests ineﬀectiveness of internal control mechanisms and/or potential presence
of collusion within the system, that is, an agreement between internal supervisors
and bribe-taking bureaucrats whereby the latter transfer part or all of their bribe
collection to the former when detected to avoid being reported in return. In this
paper we develop a three-layer hierarchy model of a public oﬃce to study the role of
collusion in controlling corruption.1 We identify an environment in which collusion
can be beneﬁcial for the principal.
The institutional set-up of our model is in the tradition of Tirole (1986, 1992)
and closer to Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1993), who study a principal-supervisor-agent
hierarchy where the supervisor can collude with the agent and underreport the
agent’s true productivity (or type) as a cover for bad performance due to low eﬀort.
They also introduce a second, incorruptible external auditor which in our context
is costless and represents sources of detection such as the media. In Kofman and
Lawarr´ ee’s optimal mechanism, which is based on a truth-telling equilibrium, collu-
sion is prevented but the authors note that there could be nontruthful equilibrium
that involves collusion and which is payoﬀ equivalent to the truth-telling (collusion-
free) equilibrium. In their set-up, as in Tirole (1986, 1992) and Laﬀont and Tirole
(1991), collusion is always harmful to the principal. Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1996)
show that the principal may prefer taking the risk of allowing collusion (to econ-
omize on corresponding deterrence costs) if the internal supervisor is more likely
to be honest than dishonest. Kessler (2000) reformulates the Kofman-Lawarr´ ee
framework to allow monitoring of eﬀort but suppresses auditing of the agent’s pro-
1In some models corruption and collusion correspond to the same phenomenon. For instance,
an excessively polluting ﬁrm may bribe the inspector (Mookherjee and Png, 1995) or a citizen
who evades taxes similarly bribes the tax oﬃcial (Hindriks et al., 1998), on detection of the
wrongful activity. In ours they correspond to two distinct interactions at diﬀerent layers of the
hierarchical chain, with diﬀering cost implications: corruption occurs when at the bottom layer
of the hierarchy a public oﬃcial knowingly grants licenses to undeserving applicants that inﬂict
direct social costs, whereas collusion is agreement to a monetary side-transfer from the corrupt
public oﬃcial to his supervisor for covering up corruption. Collusion involves no direct social costs
but aﬀects corruption. A general survey of the literature on corruption is Bardhan (1997).
1ductivity and shows, under speciﬁc assumptions, that the possibility of collusion
between the supervisor and the agent imposes no cost on the principal.
In our framework, potential collusion between a government appointed super-
visor and a license issuing public oﬃcial is again an issue. The supervisor makes a
binary eﬀort choice in monitoring and may collude with the oﬃcial hiding that the
oﬃcial accepted bribes and abused his power in issuing licenses. Our result departs
from the literature in favoring supervisor-agent collusion as a means to deter corrup-
tion. We show that motivating the supervisor with the lure of a side-transfer from
the agent, i.e. a bounty hunter mechanism, when feasible, would strictly dominate
any direct rewards-based mechanism speciﬁcally designed to eliminate collusion. In
fact, where collusion prevention is costly the principal prefers a dishonest, collusive
supervisor to an honest supervisor who never colludes. Thus, in some situations
the principal even actively encourages collusion.
Our result favoring the bounty hunter scheme relies on one important assump-
tion – the penalties for bribery and supervision oversight are nonmonetary in nature
so that they do not directly appear in the principal’s objective function. In contrast,
Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1993) and other formulations of the incentive problems in
three-layer hierarchies considered mainly monetary penalties that accrued to the
principal.2 While our assumption of nonmonetary penalties imposes a restriction
on the principal’s instruments in controlling corruption, the assumption captures
a range of applications that Kofman and Lawarr´ ee’s (1993, 1996) model did not
address, thus complementing their work. In corruption cases involving government
departments, which is the focus of our analysis, it is somewhat unusual to suggest
that the corrupt parties can “buy their way out” for the crime committed by ﬁlling
in government’s coﬀers with ﬁnes. Such an arrangement may even be considered
too soft as a policy tool. Monetary penalties imposed in criminal trials to pun-
ish corrupt oﬃcials usually fall much short of the social cost of corruption. Thus,
more often than not, nonpecuniary penalties are imposed exclusively or as a non-
substitutable part of the punishment. At the same time there is nothing to prevent
the corrupt parties to strike side-deals with monetary transfers.
We also characterize the optimal collusion-proof mechanism with notable impli-
cations for penalties, providing a contrast with the bounty hunter mechanism. For
2Kofman and Lawarr´ ee also consider a case of nonpecuniary punishments, but their principal
could replace such punishments with their monetary equivalent so long as the agent and the
supervisor had suﬃcient wealth. See also footnote 9.
2instance, a positive penalty may be imposed on the supervisor to dry up any po-
tential surplus from collusion; on the other hand, when collusion prevention is not
an issue (either because the optimal mechanism without collusion considerations
happens to be collusion-proof, or a bounty hunter mechanism is used), the supervi-
sor’s penalty is always set at zero to avoid the deadweight loss associated with the
nonmonetary nature of penalty and instead rely mainly on rewards for provision of
monitoring incentives. Also, the agent’s penalty may be set below the maximum
permissible limit to prevent collusion, whereas in the bounty hunter mechanism the
penalty may be maximal in order to minimize bribery and corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 studies the collusion-proof mechanism, which is then compared in section 4 with
the bounty hunter mechanism. Section 5 discusses alternative modiﬁcations in the
basic model. Section 6 concludes. The proofs appear in an Appendix.
2 The model
A government oﬃcer, whom we refer to as the agent, is delegated the task of
awarding a maximum number of n licenses among n applicants, with only one
license per applicant. The licenses should be given only to high-quality applicants,
denoted H; any low-quality applicant, of type L, should be turned down. A possible
interpretation is that the agent has the authority to grant licenses to all high-
quality applicants3 and the maximum number of such applicants is n. We assume
that granted licenses cannot be revoked.4
Giving a license to a low-quality applicant involves an irrecoverable social loss of
δ > 0. The social loss could arise, for instance, from the poor quality the applicant
later oﬀers the public or ineﬃciency and distortions in prospective investments in
service provision. The probability of a random applicant to be of a particular type
3The licenses could be production permits and the authority wants skilled entrepreneurs, who
are generally in short supply, to always receive such permits. Production organized by skilled
entrepreneurs have obvious beneﬁts, not the least of which is higher employment.
4A prime reason would be the state’s inability to legally justify revoking an awarded license.
In section 5 we discuss the case where low-quality applicants’ licenses are revoked if detected. We
also discuss the case where even some high-quality applicants may need to be turned down due to
the limited number of licenses for distribution. Our basic results and their intuitions continue to
hold in these cases. However, for ease of exposition, we prefer to work with the present version and
assume no licenses can be revoked and no shortage of licenses (at most n licenses for n applicants).
3is:
pr(L) = q, pr(H) = 1 − q, 0 < q < 1.
Each applicant knows his own type. We assume that given his expertise the screen-
ing agent can determine the true quality of the applicants easily, costlessly, and
without failing. This assumption rules out the potential moral hazard problem in
the agent’s choice of screening eﬀort and so keeps the analysis focused on another
moral hazard problem, that of accepting bribes to award licenses to low-quality
applicants.
On obtaining a license a low-quality applicant derives a personal beneﬁt of z
dollars in excess of his outside option. This beneﬁt is the main source of bribery.
On the other hand, a high-quality applicant’s surplus from obtaining a license is
equal to his competitive surplus elsewhere, normalized to zero. Thus a high-quality
applicant will never oﬀer a bribe, which implies bribery is proof that the agent
deliberately issued the license to an undeserving, low-quality applicant. We assume
that bribes cannot be conﬁscated.5
There are two potential sources of detection of bribery. First, the principal can
hire a supervisor (an internal auditor) to check on the agent’s potential involvement
in bribery. The supervisor either exerts a ﬁxed eﬀort normalized to e = 1 that costs
him in disutility η > 0, or shirks so that e = 0 and costs zero.6 The supervisor
is unable to detect any bribery if he shirks. With e = 1, however, if k licenses
are given to low-quality applicants, the supervisor detects bribery with probability
r(k). The function r(k) is increasing and strictly convex, with r(k) ∈ [0,1) in the
relevant range k ∈ [0,n], and r(0) = 0, r0(0) = 0. Thus, a larger number of license
awards to low-quality applicants makes detection an increasingly likely event. We
treat the agent’s choice of k as a continuous variable to facilitate derivations and
provide intuitions, but the qualitative results will be the same for the alternative
(and more accurate) discrete variable interpretation.
5The assumption would be reasonable if the agent consumes or diverts the bribe money beyond
the authority’s reach. Moreover, it is possible that bribery gets uncovered long after the event, and
even if it is detected promptly there could be legal/practical diﬃculties prohibiting its recovery.
In any case relaxing the assumption is not going to change the qualitative result much, as we
discuss in section 5.
6The supervisor’s binary monitoring choice could be replaced by a continuous monitoring eﬀort
choice, but this would introduce unnecessary complication: the probability of detection becomes
a function of both the number of bribes accepted and the level of monitoring eﬀort.
4The second potential source of detection is “external” and detects bribery, if
there is any, with a ﬁxed probability 0 < α < 1. The external detection source
is assumed incorruptible, i.e., never colludes with the agent or the supervisor, and
completely free of charge; we simply refer to it as the media.7 To keep the analysis
simple we also assume that α does not depend on the number k of license awards
to low-quality applicants.8
All parties are risk neutral and their outside option payoﬀs are normalized to
zero. The various parameters of the model such as z, α etc. and the monitoring
technology, r(·), are common knowledge.
The incentive scheme includes a ﬂat wage wS and a reward pS to the supervisor
for reporting bribery; if the supervisor fails to report bribery uncovered by the
media, then he is penalized FS. The agent’s wage is denoted wA. If bribery is
uncovered and reported either by the supervisor or the media, the agent is penalized
FA. The penalty is the same whether the agent took bribe from one or more
than one applicant. There is an upper bound F > 0 on the penalties for the
crime in question, which we assume is common to FA and FS; F is determined
outside the model by the jurisdiction, the constitution or the executive power with
considerations much broader than those dictated by the objective of our principal.
We interpret penalties FA and FS as nonmonetary sanctions so that they do not
explicitly appear as negative items in the principal’s cost minimization objective.9
7The external source may represent an elite (group of) employee(s) of a government agency
such as Independent Commission Against Corruption in the case of Hong Kong (see Klitgaard,
1988), or Central Bureau of Investigation and Central Vigilance Commission in the case of India.
Alternatively, it can be thought of as journalists/watchdogs who hunt for corruption news.
8A justiﬁcation for this assumption is that the media’s intensity of monitoring is set exogenously
with the aim of uncovering corruption and various other news in a whole range of public life. The
chance of the media catching wrongdoing in a particular government department is fairly low and
largely insensitive to the scale of a particular event. In section 5 we brieﬂy discuss the impact of
allowing α to vary with the number of bribes.
9In our context penalties often take the form of blacklisting, sacking or demotion, and even
imprisonment. While imprisonment is costly, these costs are usually the responsibility of the
state’s law and order department and not of a speciﬁc government department. The assumption
of only nonmonetary penalties in our setup is diﬀerent from both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
punishments in Kofman–Lawarr´ ee (1993). In their model, so long as the monetary equivalent
of nonpecuniary punishment does not exceed the agent’s wealth, the principal can reward the
supervisor by replacing nonpecuniary punishment with its monetary equivalent. They thus include
monetary penalties as positive items in the principal’s expected payoﬀ maximization objective. In
contrast, we do not consider the penalties as direct components of the principal’s objective function
5The corruption game we analyze is comprised of four stages.
1. Contract stage. The principal designs the contracts and oﬀers one for the
agent and one for the supervisor. Acceptance leads to the second stage.
2. Corruption-inspection stage. The agent meets applicants and executes his
bribe solicitation strategy without knowing whether the supervisor actually
engaged (or is going to engage) in monitoring (or equivalently, auditing). The
supervisor determines his monitoring strategy under incomplete information
about realization of the agent’s strategy.
3. Collusion stage. The outcome of the corruption-inspection stage is realized.
If the supervisor detects bribery, the two parties may collude.
4. Execution of contracts. The principal receives a report from the supervisor
and possibly also from the “media”, then executes the contracts.
The inspection-corruption stage admits several interpretations: The supervisor
and the agent can be acting simultaneously, or the supervisor may be inspecting the
agent ex-post, through the accepted application ﬁles. If the supervisor’s incentive
compatibility constraint is satisﬁed, the agent knows that he is actually, or will be
in the future, inspected with probability one. The agent will determine accordingly
the optimal number of bribe solicitation and the timing of inspection is therefore
not a crucial issue.
3 Collusion and its prevention
3.1 Honest supervisor
As a reference point, we consider ﬁrst the case where the supervisor does not collude
with the agent, i.e., the supervisor is honest or incorruptible just like the external
source of detection.
because these penalties never accrue to the principal. Instead, the nonmonetary penalties appear
only indirectly in the principal’s overall cost-minimization objective through possible side-transfers
to the supervisor (if collusion is allowed). That is, we assume the agent’s wealth to be suﬃciently
large to (weakly) exceed the maximum permissible nonmonetary penalty.
6The principal’s objective is to minimize the overall costs of corruption consisting
of the social costs and the enforcement costs:





n−j[r(b(j)) · pS + b(j)δ], (1)
where b(j) is the number of bribes accepted by the agent from a total turnout of
j low-quality applicants and r(·) is the supervisor’s corresponding detection prob-
ability.
Consider the agent’s bribe solicitation strategy. Suppose the agent has all the
bargaining power in determining the size of the bribe for accepting a low-quality
applicant. Then any low-quality applicant, when asked for a bribe, simply pays z,
his entire monetary beneﬁt from obtaining a license.10 The agent’s expected payoﬀ
from taking k bribes, 1 ≤ k ≤ j, when the supervisor exerts eﬀort and monitors, is
UA(k) = wA + kz − [α + (1 − α)r(k)]FA; (2)
when no bribe is taken, the payoﬀ is wA.
Deﬁne k∗(FA) as the solution to the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition,11
z = (1 − α)r
0(k)FA. (3)
Where clearly understood, we suppress the argument and denote k∗(FA) simply as
k∗. Next, when the supervisor is employed and given incentives to monitor, deﬁne
x(FA) to be the smallest positive real number such that
x(FA) · z ≥ [α + (1 − α)r(x(FA))]FA. (4)
For the agent to solicit bribes, the turnout of low-quality applicants must (weakly)
exceed x(FA). If no such x(FA) exists, the agent takes no bribes. We avoid this
uninteresting case by assuming a ﬁnite x(F) < n exists. When the supervisor is
not employed or does not monitor, deﬁne ˆ x(FA) satisfying ˆ x(FA) · z = αFA and
interpret it the same way as x(FA).
10Alternatively, z can be split half-half in the Nash bargaining fashion as in Basu et al. (1992)
or Besley and McLaren (1993); then the bribe z can be redeﬁned accordingly. Marjit and Shi
(1998) have shown that the structure of bargaining (Nash or take-it-or-leave-it) often determines
the degree of eﬀectiveness of various corruption control measures. Our results, mostly qualitative
in nature, are robust with respect to alternative bargaining schemes.
11The second-order condition is satisﬁed: −(1 − α)r00(·)FA < 0.
7Lemma 1 (i) Always k∗(FA) ≥ x(FA);
(ii) x(FA) satisﬁes (4) with equality;
(iii) k∗(FA) is decreasing and x(FA) is increasing in FA, and both are continuous
in FA.
Clearly, x(FA) > ˆ x(FA).
Below we present the optimal bribe solicitation strategy with k∗ as a continuous
variable (refer section 2), but the optimal strategy can also be stated after convert-
ing any non-integer k∗(FA) to its next higher or lower integer value, whichever
yields the agent a higher expected payoﬀ.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Bribe solicitation. Suppose the supervisor is employed and monitors the agent.







if j < x(FA);
if j ≥ x(FA).
(See Figure 1). Also, the strategy, b∗(j,FA), is (weakly) decreasing and continuous
in FA.
When the supervisor is not employed or does not monitor, the agent would solicit






if j < ˆ x(FA);
if j ≥ ˆ x(FA).
Optimality of ˆ b(j,FA) is obvious. Optimality of b∗(·,·) follows from strict con-
cavity of the agent’s expected payoﬀ in k. That b∗(·,·) is (weakly) decreasing in
FA is straightforward, given Lemma 1, and continuity of b∗(·,FA) is implied by
continuity of x(FA) and k∗(FA) and the min{.,.} function. Henceforth we suppress
the argument FA and denote b∗(j,FA) simply as b∗(j), where there is no confusion.
To avoid a diﬀerent type of confusion, it is worth remarking that the agent’s
bribe solicitation strategy formulated above for the honest supervisor case will be
8no diﬀerent when the supervisor is dishonest, that is, open to collusion with the
agent. Later on we will denote the agent’s strategy using alternative notations such
as bCP(j) and bBH(j), depending on whether a collusion-proof or a bounty hunter
arrangement is being analyzed.
Given b∗(j), the ex-ante12 expected payoﬀ and participation constraint of the
agent is







∗(j)))·FA] ≥ 0. (2
0)
Since the agent can guarantee himself wA by remaining honest and the agent’s bribe
solicitation does not depend on wA, the principal sets w∗
A = 0.
Consider now the supervisor’s problem. The supervisor will exert the monitoring
eﬀort and incur the cost η if and only if both the incentive compatibility constraint




























∗(j))pS − (1 − r(b
∗(j)))αFS] − η ≥ 0. (6)
We start with the following observations regarding the supervisor’s optimal
incentive scheme:
Lemma 2 To minimize the overall costs, the principal must choose pS and FS
to bind the eﬀort incentive constraint (5). Speciﬁcally, the penalty FS should be
set at zero so that the reward pS satisfying (5) with equality is minimized, thereby
minimizing (1).
Also, the supervisor’s optimal wage is w∗
S = 0.
Let us explain the intuition for why the optimal FS is zero. From the partici-
pation constraint (6) it follows that the enforcement costs (supervisor’s wage plus
expected rewards) in total expected costs must be at least η, strictly exceeding η
12That is, before the agent knows j, the actual number of low-quality applicants.
9if FS > 0. Note that setting FS = 0 and choosing pS to bind the incentive compat-
ibility constraint also satisﬁes the participation constraint with equality if wS = 0.
This way, enforcement costs are minimized, which is optimal for the principal. In
short, in choosing among the instruments to inﬂuence the supervisor’s monitor-
ing incentives, the carrot (i.e., pS) is better than the stick because the deadweight
loss of nonmonetary penalty can be justiﬁed only for its deterrence role; however,
the supervisor gets penalized even when he exerts the eﬀort but fails to uncover
corruption.
The agent’s penalty, FA, despite its nonmonetary nature and the associated
deadweight loss, must be set at a positive level unlike the penalty on the supervisor
because it is the sole instrument available to control the agent. But the choice of FA
involves a potential tradeoﬀ: Setting a large FA decreases the number of bribes but
requires a larger reward promise to the supervisor, suggesting an ambiguous impact
on the principal’s cost objective. However, because rewards can always be adjusted
to keep the principal’s expected (reward) cost of using the supervisor equal to η,
the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates, thus a larger FA is always beneﬁcial as it lowers
corruption and the associated social costs:13
Lemma 3 Given F ∗
S = w∗
S = w∗
A = 0, decreasing the agent’s penalty will increase
the overall costs for the principal, hence F ∗
A = F.
Finally, the agent’s participation constraint (20) need not bind: with the optimal
incentives already determined there is no other instrument left for the principal to
run down the agent’s rent.
We summarize the results obtained so far as follows:
Proposition 1 If the supervisor is employed, in the absence of collusion the prin-
cipal minimizes overall expected costs of corruption by setting the maximal penalty
F ∗
A = F on the agent and inducing the most conservative bribe solicitation strategy
b∗(j,F).
The supervisor’s penalty is set at F ∗
S = 0 and reward p∗
S is just large enough to
induce eﬀort, satisfying (5) with equality.
13Note that the conclusion that FA must be set at the maximal level relies on the premise
that increasing FA would strictly lower b∗(j,FA) by continuously lowering k∗. However, due to
the discrete nature of bribe solicitation possibilities it is possible that FA is not set maximally;
instead, FA is increased only to the point beyond which any further impact on the agent’s bribe
solicitation strategy would vanish.
10Both wages are set to bind the limited liability constraints for the supervisor and
the agent: w∗
A = 0 and w∗
S = 0.
The alternative option for the principal is to dispense with the supervisor and
rely exclusively on the external source of detection. As in the case where the
supervisor is employed, the principal sets ˆ wA = 0 and FA maximal at F inducing







Using the incentive scheme characterized in Proposition 1, the principal’s total













which will hold if the number of bribes induced by employing the supervisor is
suﬃciently low to compensate for the monitoring cost η incurred by the principal.
We assume that this condition holds, so that the supervisor is hired, in the rest of
the paper.
3.2 Dishonest supervisor
We now consider the supervisor to be dishonest, who will collude with the agent
if there is a surplus from doing so. To dissuade the supervisor from accepting
side-transfers from the agent, the supervisor’s rewards should satisfy the collusion-
proofness constraint (in short, CPC):
pS ≥ (1 − α)FA − αFS. (7)
The agent cannot guarantee escaping punishment by making a side-transfer to the
supervisor because the media can uncover bribery. Also, the fact that the supervisor
is penalized for not reporting bribery that is uncovered by the media puts a check on
the supervisor in accepting bribes, lowering the required rewards for the supervisor.
The principal now minimizes (1) subject to (7), the eﬀort incentive constraint
(5) and the participation constraint (6), with the agent choosing his bribe solicita-
tion strategy optimally. The following proposition describes certain features of the
optimal collusion-proof incentive scheme for the principal.
11Proposition 2 Suppose that the (*)-mechanism described in Proposition 1 vio-
lates the constraint (7). Under the optimal collusion-proof (CP) mechanism, the




[ii] The collusion-proofness constraint (7) is always binding.
[iii] The supervisor’s participation constraint (6) must also bind unless F CP
S = F.
To bind (6) the principal should substitute the rewards pS with an increase in
the penalties FS, whenever possible (i.e., without violating (7)).
[iv] Either F CP
A < F or F CP
S > 0 must hold (or possibly both hold).
[v] Both the supervisor and the agent may earn some positive rent.
Although not a complete characterization, Proposition 2 describes a number
of important features that derive from potential collusion. First, the collusion-
proofness constraint must always bind. This is intuitive, given that collusion is the
main reason why the principal must depart from the (*)-mechanism derived under
the honest supervisor assumption. Second, the agent’s maximal penalty property
of Proposition 1 may no longer hold; alternative to lowering FA (which increases
bribery, thus, social costs), the principal must either increase pS or increase FS,
both of which are also costly directly or indirectly. Third, despite the associated
deadweight loss, the principal may set the penalty FS at a positive level in contrast
to the honest supervisor model of Proposition 1, where he could rely more on
direct rewards to the supervisor for provision of monitoring incentives. Fourth,
the principal may have to leave a positive surplus to the supervisor in order to
eliminate the possibility of collusion. These last three factors combine to make
collusion prevention costly.
What is not possible, however, is to identify a clear pecking order in the choice
between a positive FS and a non-maximal FA (refer part [iv] above). The two
adjustments have diﬀerent cost implications – positive FS involves deadweight loss
and non-maximal FA involves both higher enforcement costs and higher social costs
of corruption. Depending on the rate of increases in overall costs resulting from
each type of adjustment, one or both instruments could be relied upon by the
principal. Finally, the principal’s preference for any adjustment by increasing FS
12and lowering of pS, whenever possible (i.e., without violating any of the constraints),
is understandable given that it economizes on direct reward payments and eases
the collusion-proofness constraint.
4 The bounty hunter mechanism
In this section we evaluate the performance of the bounty hunter (in short, BH)
mechanism, whereby the principal allows collusion and replaces direct rewards pS by
the potential side-transfer the supervisor may obtain from the agent upon detection
of bribery.
Throughout the analysis we assume that the supervisor can destroy any credible
evidence of bribery to reach a side-transfer agreement with the agent. Therefore,
unless bribery is uncovered by the media, the colluding parties guarantee no pun-
ishment.14 We also assume that the supervisor has all the bargaining power in
determining the side-transfer, which is therefore given by (1−α)FA, the maximum
that the agent is willing to pay. For a positive surplus from collusion, this amount
should exceed pS + αFS, the minimum the supervisor must be paid for destroying
the evidence.15
The BH-mechanism economizes on the monitoring cost η. However, it may
generate a potential cost due to the loss of the instrument, pS. The supervisor’s
“reward”, now determined by the right-hand side of (7) as (1 − α)FA − αFS, is
bounded above by maximal penalties, thus may not be large enough to satisfy the
supervisor’s incentive and participation constraints.
We begin the analysis of the BH-mechanism with some basic observations about
incentives in the hierarchy. Note that the agent’s expected payoﬀ and participation
constraint under collusion is exactly as given in (20): If the agent is bribed and
14Collusive agreements can be enforced through internal mechanisms involving credible threats
of retaliations; it can be endogenized in a multi-period model, but this is beyond the scope of this
paper.
15The assumption that the supervisor has all the bargaining power can be replaced by a gen-
eral bargaining process where the agent’s transfer is an increasing function of the supervisor’s
disagreement utility, as in the Nash bargaining solution. Under the BH-mechanism the principal
can inﬂuence the supervisor’s disagreement utility through the unpaid, oﬃcial, reward pBH
S . If
pBH
S is chosen arbitrarily close to but less than (1−α)FBH
A (and choosing optimally FBH
S = 0; see
Lemma 4), the supervisor will have almost all the bargaining power and the transfer he receives
from the agent will be (1 − α)FBH
A .
13detected by the supervisor, under collusion he pays (1−α)FA to the supervisor for
not reporting, but risks paying an additional FA to the principal with probability
α if detected by the media; without collusion he pays the entire penalty FA to the
principal, which yields the same expected payoﬀ expression. Then, given FA, the
agent’s bribe solicitation strategy is also unchanged, as stated in the honest super-
visor case following Lemma 1: bBH(j,FA) = b∗(j,FA). Under the BH-mechanism
the supervisor’s incentive and participation constraints are respectively (8) and (9),













∗(j,FA))(1 − α)FA − αFS] − η ≥ 0. (9)
Our analysis of the BH-mechanism to follow will be for two diﬀerent settings:
in the ﬁrst, the (*)-mechanism is not collusion-proof so that the alternative to the
BH-mechanism is the CP-mechanism; in the second, the (*)-mechanism is collusion-
proof, thus, is also the alternative to the BH-mechanism. The following result
characterizes optimal BH-mechanism common to both settings.
Lemma 4 Under any optimal bounty hunter mechanism, the principal always sets
F BH
S = 0 along with wBH
S = wBH
A = 0.
Intuitively, why penalize the supervisor for not reporting bribery uncovered by the
media if, after all, the incentives are especially designed to induce the supervisor
to collude with the corrupt agent? In more detail, the penalty FS has no eﬀect
on the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint: A positive penalty decreases
the supervisor’s expected payoﬀs from not monitoring and monitoring the agent
by the same amount, because he does not report bribery in either case. But a
positive value for F BH
S has a negative impact on the supervisor’s overall expected
payoﬀ which, to keep the participation constraint satisﬁed, must be compensated
for by an increase in the base wage wS and so brings in an additional cost for the
principal. Hence, F BH
S = 0.
4.1 When the (*)-mechanism is not collusion-proof
When the (*)-mechanism fails to be collusion-proof, collusion prevention is costly as
shown in Proposition 2. Then the principal’s options are either to prevent collusion
14through the CP-mechanism, or to allow collusion through the BH-mechanism. The
following proposition compares these two options.
Proposition 3 Suppose the (*)-mechanism is not collusion-proof, that is, p∗
S <
(1 − α)F. Then, in the optimal bounty hunter mechanism the principal sets the
agent’s penalty maximal at F BH
A = F and induces the bribe strategy bBH(j,F) ≤
bCP(j,F CP
A ). As a result, total expected costs of corruption under the optimal bounty
hunter mechanism will be strictly less than under the optimal CP-mechanism.
We emphasize the following implication of Proposition 3:
When penalties are mainly nonmonetary in nature and collusion prevention is
costly, the principal would strictly beneﬁt to control corruption by allowing collusion.
There is a simple intuition to why the BH-mechanism should be preferred. In
the collusion-proof scheme the (nonmonetary) penalties that are enforced would
have been lost from the system, whereas under the bounty hunter arrangement
those penalties eﬀectively ﬁnance the monitoring costs. Thus, overall the society
is better oﬀ by at least the monitoring cost η. At least, because, in addition the
BH-mechanism can induce a smaller expected number of bribes with bBH(j,F) <
bCP(j,F CP
A ), if F CP
A < F.
Perhaps more striking is that, when the (*)-mechanism fails to be collusion-
proof, the principal would not only allow collusion, he should even actively encourage
collusion! That is, the principal should hire a dishonest supervisor rather than an
honest supervisor. Hiring an honest supervisor implies that the total cost will be
according to the (*)-mechanism. Hiring a dishonest supervisor and implementing
the BH-mechanism actually reduces the total cost because the principal induces
the same bribe solicitation strategy, bBH(j,F) = b∗(j,F), without having to pay
any reward to the supervisor.16
16This logic can be extended to the case where the supervisor’s type (honest or dishonest) is
private knowledge. Though we do not solve for the optimal mechanism under uncertainty about
the supervisor’s honesty, based on the results above we can conclude that a dishonest supervisor
would be preferred to a supervisor who is honest with positive (but less than one) probability. In
the latter case, to induce an equilibrium where the agent is monitored with probability one, the
principal has to rely on CP-mechanism because the alternative of BH-mechanism may not work
if the supervisor turns out to be honest, while the (*)-mechanism will not work if the supervisor
is dishonest. Total costs will then be smaller under a dishonest supervisor operating under the
BH-mechanism. This is in line with a result in Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1996) that we discuss
below.
15We are not aware of any obvious theoretical justiﬁcation for why the princi-
pal may want to actively encourage ‘cover-up’ of corruption (i.e., collusion). The
general emphasis has been (Tirole, 1986, 1992; Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991) that col-
lusion harms the principal. In a diﬀerent context Olsen and Torsvik (1998) show
that collusion between the supervisor and the agent may beneﬁt the principal by
alleviating an intertemporal contractual commitment problem. The beneﬁts of the
BH-mechanism are reminiscent of a ﬁnding by Itoh (1993) that the principal may
prefer side-contracting amongst agents. Kessler (2000) provides a setup in which
collusion imposes no cost on the principal but her model diﬀers substantially from
the present one. Moreover in her model inducing collusion never dominates the
collusion-free mechanism. Kofman and Lawarr´ ee (1996) show that collusion may
be allowed under incomplete information about the supervisor’s type, if ex-ante
the supervisor is likely to be honest, to economize on the cost of deterring collu-
sion. In their setup collusion is always harmful and the principal prefers the honest,
non-collusive supervisor type.
In our context, the principal’s preference for a dishonest supervisor partly relies
on the assumption that the (*)-mechanism is not collusion-proof. When the (*)-
mechanism is collusion-proof, the case we analyze next, the BH-mechanism would
induce an increase in bribery above b∗(j,F). However the savings on enforcement
costs, η, could still be large relative to the increased social costs of bribery to justify
the use of a dishonest supervisor. Thus, the main intuition in favor of collusion (or
encouragement of collusion) remains valid.
4.2 When the (*)-mechanism is collusion-proof
We now focus on the case p∗
S > (1 − α)F so that collusion prevention is no longer
costly. In such situations the BH-mechanism potentially runs into a diﬃculty be-
cause the agent’s penalty FA performs two functions at the same time. It deter-
mines the agent’s bribe solicitation strategy and the supervisor’s reward to motivate
monitoring. The principal may not be able to hit both targets with the same one
instrument, that is, BH-mechanism may no longer be feasible.
BH-mechanism is feasible if there exists a penalty FA ∈ [0,F) such that, given






∗(j,FA))(1 − α)FA ≥ η. (10)
16Condition (10) is same as (8), the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint17
which, recall, is satisﬁed with equality under the (*)-mechanism where FA = F and
p∗
S replaces (1 − α)F.
Clearly, in the case p∗
S > (1−α)F the principal cannot induce the same outcome
through the BH-mechanism by setting the agent’s penalty maximal at FA = F for
this will violate (10): Given the agent’s bribe solicitation strategy b∗(j,F), the
maximum “reward” (1−α)F the supervisor can get from the agent by monitoring
and detecting bribery is not large enough to compensate the supervisor for the
monitoring cost η. Then the principal has to modify the agent’s penalty within
the feasible range [0,F) and see whether (10) can be satisﬁed to induce monitoring
eﬀort given the agent’s optimal bribe solicitation strategy b∗(j,FA).
Lowering the penalty FA below F will have opposing eﬀects on the supervisor’s
monitoring incentives: the L.H.S. of (10) tends to increase due to the increase in
b∗(j,FA), whereas the opposite happens due to the decrease in indirect rewards
component (1 − α)FA. Thus, even when the agent’s penalty is lowered, the BH-
mechanism may not be feasible. The next question is whether, when feasible, the
optimal BH-mechanism would generate lower costs than the (*)-mechanism. If
BH-mechanism were feasible for penalties close enough to F, the principal would
prefer using it to economize on expected reward payments (which amount to η)
and accept a small increase in the incidence of bribery.18 But as FA is lowered
suﬃciently, the agent will switch to soliciting bribes from all low-quality applicants,
setting b(j,FA) = j. The principal’s total costs must then exceed the costs under
the (*)-mechanism.19
When BH-mechanism is feasible, let F + denote the maximal penalty FA < F
satisfying (10) given b∗(j,FA). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose p∗
S > (1 − α)F so that the principal can implement the
bribe solicitation strategy b∗(j) collusion-proof by imposing the maximal penalty on
the agent through the (*)-mechanism. If the bounty hunter mechanism is feasible
and used, then wBH
A = wBH
S = F BH
S = 0 and the optimal penalty for the agent is
17It also represents the supervisor’s participation constraint because, by Lemma 4, wBH
S = 0.
18Lowering FA slightly below F causes a discrete reduction in enforcement costs by η, whereas
bribery may slightly increase, or even remain the same due to the discrete nature of bribe solici-
tation possibilities.
19Recall, we assumed that the costs under the (*)-mechanism are lower than the case in which
the supervisor is not used (where the external source, the media, is the sole source of detection).
17set at F +, inducing the bribe solicitation strategy bBH(j,F +) = b∗(j,F +) > b∗(j).


















The optimal penalty under the BH-mechanism is set as large as possible, thus
equals F +, because among all FA that satisfy (10) and so induce the supervisor
to monitor, the penalty F + minimizes the agent’s bribe solicitation b(j,FA) and
thereby minimizes also the principal’s cost objective. An interesting feature of the
BH-mechanism is that the agent’s penalty is less than F, the “oﬃcial” upper bound
on FA.20
To clarify the role of nonmonetary penalties for the dominance of the bounty
hunter arrangement, let us alternatively consider monetary penalties. A short ar-
gument suﬃces for our purpose. Fix any conﬁguration of bounty hunter incentives.
In any state where the supervisor detects and hides bribery, he receives a transfer
of (1 − α)F BH
A from the agent and consequently the principal would lose penal-
ties of expected value (1 − α)F BH
A . However, if the principal chooses the reward
pS = (1 − α)F BH
A , in any state of detection of the bribery the supervisor would no
longer hide it and as a result the principal’s (expected) penalty collection from the
agent increases by (1−α)F BH
A with which the reward pS is ﬁnanced. Thus the prin-
cipal’s gains and losses balance out, while no other constraints are aﬀected. This
shows that under monetary penalties there is an alternative, collusion-free mech-
anism that does at least as well as the BH-mechanism, hence the bounty hunter
arrangement cannot dominate collusion-proof incentives. Furthermore, because
the principal is free to adjust pS, the feasible set of incentives under alternative
collusion-free mechanisms is strictly larger than under the BH-mechanism, which
may bring down the overall costs for the principal. Thus, the principal would never
gain by choosing the BH-mechanism under monetary penalties. This reasoning con-
tinues to hold for the issue of hiring a dishonest supervisor or an honest supervisor:
Under monetary penalties the principal will opt for an honest supervisor.
20While the literature on crime deterrence provides several reasons for why penalties may not
be set maximal, none of these coincide with the explanation we provide in this paper, which, as
mentioned, stems from the principal’s motive to generate collusion between the supervisor and
the agent at minimum cost.
18Thus, changing the nature of penalties from monetary to nonmonetary can
drastically modify the principal’s choice of control mechanism. Reality is somewhere
between the two extremes. Favoring monetary penalties will no doubt strengthen
the case against the use of collusion in controlling corruption. If corrupt agents
can conceal or ﬁnd a way of protecting large fractions of their wealth from public
authorities, penalties are de facto mostly nonmonetary. In such environments our
results are in favor of the bounty hunter mechanism.
5 Results under alternative assumptions
Most of our assumptions are mainly to keep the analysis simple and focused with
the basic intuitions robust to plausible modiﬁcations. Below we brieﬂy discuss
the importance of various assumptions and consider their modiﬁcations to check
whether and how our results may change.
We assumed that the number of applicants, say m, is equal to n, the maximum
number of licenses to be awarded. If m > n, a door opens for the agent to extract
bribes from even the high-quality applicants. However, under our assumption that
high-quality applicants’ surplus from the speciﬁc license is equal to their competitive
surplus elsewhere, the agent cannot hope to extract any bribe from these applicants.
Suppose, then, that high-quality applicants derive a positive surplus speciﬁc to the
license, say πH, strictly less than πL, a corresponding surplus for the low-quality
applicants.21 Now the government can impose a license fee κ = πH, so that the
agent is no longer able to extract bribes from the high-quality applicants. Then
the net surplus to any low-quality applicant would be z = πL − κ > 0, which is
available for bribery. With this modiﬁcation, the principal would minimize the
following modiﬁed cost objective:





m−j[r(b(j)) · pS + b(j)δ
+ min{b(j),m − j + b(j) − n} · 1{m−j+b(j)>n} · βH
− min{n,m − j + b(j)} · κ], (11)
21While a low-quality applicant derives a greater personal beneﬁt from the license, the overall
social surplus is larger if the license is awarded to a high-quality applicant. This is in contrast
with Banerjee (1997), for example, where both personal and social beneﬁts are higher for the
high-quality applicants.
19where βH is the additional social beneﬁt (over and above the applicant’s personal
beneﬁt) from awarding a license to a high-quality applicant, and 1{·} is the indicator
function. In (11), the expression in the second line measures the social beneﬁts that
are lost (thus, stacking up extra social costs over and above the δ-costs) as some
high-quality applicants miss out obtaining licenses when the agent awards licenses
to some low-quality applicants instead. The expression in the third line of (11)
represents expected license fees. These two expressions were absent in our original
formulation of the principal’s cost-minimization problem in (1) because there a
high-quality applicant always received a license, for free.
The solutions to the principal’s problem will be qualitatively aﬀected only if the
above modiﬁcation substantively alters the principal’s approach to containment of
bribery through the penalties (both on the agent and the supervisor) and/or the
supervisor rewards; the wages perform no essential role. Note that the sole impact of
the modiﬁcation in the cost objective is to increase the social cost of bribery.22 The
decisions of bribe solicitation, monitoring and collusion are not aﬀected in any way,
hence the incentive compatibility, collusion-proofness and participation constraints
are unchanged. In the honest supervisor model of section 3.1, the principal sets
FA maximal and binds the supervisor’s incentive and participation constraints;
modifying these incentives would clearly increase both social costs (due to δ) and
lost beneﬁts (due to βH) that are likely to exceed any increase in revenues from
the granting of licenses to low-quality types. In the dishonest supervisor case of
section 3.2, our ﬁndings that the agent’s penalty may be less than the maximal
and the supervisor’s penalty possibly positive are derived based on the fact that
always the CPC and often the PCS are binding. These last two results involving
the constraints (see parts [i] and [ii] of Proposition 2) are obtained by the method
of contradictions without altering FA and the induced bribery b(j).23 But because
b(j) is the only variable (under principal’s indirect control) appearing in the two
additional terms of the modiﬁed objective function (11), our method of proof by
contradictions in Proposition 2 remains valid. Finally, the argument in our main
result in Proposition 3 is very general and works equally well with the modiﬁcation
22While the license fees do bring down the costs, granting licenses to low-quality applicants
should never be the principal’s objective.
23The only instance where FA is altered is to prove that it must be maximal to bind the CPC.
When the CPC is not binding and the penalty is non-maximal, the (logic of) improvement in the
cost objective by increasing the penalty, FA, remains valid for the modiﬁed cost objective.
20in the objective function. The main qualitative result in Proposition 4 is that, even
when collusion prevention is not costly the BH-mechanism may be of value to the
principal, especially if the supervision cost η is large. The intuition behind this
result should therefore continue to be valid under the modiﬁed objective function.
We assumed no conﬁscation of bribes. Suppose now that all bribes can be
costlessly conﬁscated by the state (principal) – a polar opposite assumption. The
monitored agent will reduce bribe solicitation because the potential loss of cor-
rupt proceeds aﬀects his incentives in the same qualitative way as an increase in
the penalty FA. Under the (*)-mechanism the principal modiﬁes pS to keep the
supervisor’s expected reward payments equal to the monitoring cost η. All other
components of the mechanism are unchanged. Thus, if bribes can all be conﬁscated
upon detection, under (*)-mechanism total costs will fall for two reasons, ﬁrst be-
cause corruption is lower, and second, because the principal can ﬁnance part of
reward payments to the supervisor through conﬁscated bribes. The possibility of
collusion now depends on the number of bribes and on the supervisor’s information
about this number. Let us assume that the supervisor learns the number of bribes
or their size if monitoring is successful, and that if the parties collude and corrup-
tion is detected by the media, the bribes can still be conﬁscated, this time from the
supervisor. To achieve collusion-proofness, the principal has to consider the case
where the agent pockets the sum k∗(FA)z and is not constrained by the turnout of
low-quality applications. Then the collusion-proofness constraint will change, the
R.H.S. increasing by (1 − α)k∗(FA)z. Modifying the incentive scheme to satisfy
collusion-proofness will increase costs under the CP-mechanism in accordance with
our claim in Proposition 2. Consider now the BH-mechanism, where the bribed
and detected agent is willing to transfer the sum (1 − α)(FA + min{j,k∗(FA)}z)
to the supervisor to avoid being reported. Clearly the agent’s payoﬀ and bribe
solicitation strategy are exactly the same as under the new (*)-mechanism (i.e., the
mechanism relevant for the conﬁscated-bribe version) because the agent gets the
same payoﬀ in every outcome of the monitoring game. So if the new (*)-mechanism
is not collusion-proof and the BH-mechanism is used instead of the CP-mechanism,
the principal economizes at least the monitoring cost η but will loose the expected
bribe proceeds to the supervisor.24 We conclude that the ranking of mechanisms
24But if in addition even the bribe-transfer to the supervisor can be conﬁscated (recall, bribe-
transfer is only a part of the side-transfer), then the noted loss for the principal will not occur.
21stated in Proposition 3 and 4 continues to hold unless expected bribe proceeds are
very large.
We assumed for simplicity that licenses cannot be revoked once awarded. The
possibility of revoking low-quality applicants’ licenses reduces the bribe that these
applicants are willing to oﬀer, thus decreases the agent’s private beneﬁt from cor-
ruption and reduces his bribe solicitation given the penalty. If these licenses can
be revoked before the social harm is realized, the social cost of corruption will be
eliminated whenever corruption is detected. The advantage of BH-mechanism rel-
ative to the CP-mechanism is the same: to economize on monitoring costs η and
incentive costs as mentioned in Proposition 2. Its disadvantage is that expected
corruption and the associated costs are likely to be larger. The disadvantage will
be small the more promptly the licenses are revoked, that is, before the social harm
is inﬂicted.
Our assumption regarding the timing of the agent’s bribe solicitation strategy
and the internal supervisor’s monitoring decision can be questioned. As is typ-
ically the case in inspection games, we assumed that the two parties act under
incomplete information about each other’s actions. They could thus be acting
simultaneously, or sequentially, the agent ﬁrst, followed by the supervisor under
incomplete information about the agent’s bribe proceeds. One could also introduce
an additional ex-post stage of inspection, to be activated if the internal supervi-
sor observes/reports some bribery. Such an extension would be worthwhile if the
penalty is made contingent on the proportion of inspected applications awarded
to undeserving applicants, in the spirit of “penalty ﬁtting the crime.” We do not
pursue this line of inquiry for two reasons: practicality and simplicity. Rarely is it
the case that the media or an internal audit inspects each and every application (or
even a large proportion of applications) to determine the fraction of inappropriately
awarded licenses. Such large scale inspection could be costly to administer. Also,
contingent penalty schemes will complicate the analysis and we do not believe our
main results will be aﬀected qualitatively.
We assumed the probability of detection α by the external source, media, to be
constant. Allowing α to be (weakly) increasing in the number of bribe solicitations,
k, is perhaps more realistic but the analysis becomes much more involved. Instead
of making conjectures about the detailed implications for our analysis, we would
indicate how the strategies of the two main players – the agent and the supervisor
22– are aﬀected and what it might mean for the principal. If one assumes α(k) to be
concave in k (similar to the strict concavity of r(k)) and α0(n) suﬃciently small to
satisfy the second-order condition for the agent’s problem, then the agent’s optimal
k∗(FA) will be unique and decreasing in FA. Also it is easy to check (as in Lemma
1 proof) that the bribe trigger x(FA), solving x · z = [α(x) + (1 − α(x))r(x))]FA,
will be increasing in FA. These two facts together imply that the agent’s optimal
bribe solicitation strategy, b∗(j,FA), will be qualitatively the same as before. As for
the supervisor’s incentives, the reward pS and the penalty FS basically work in the
same way as before. The principal may still not want to impose a positive penalty
on the supervisor when collusion is not an issue, because the penalty is still a
deadweight loss that can be saved. However, how the principal should design either
the collusion-proof or bounty hunter incentives are relatively diﬃcult issues. In both
these cases the principal’s approach to the supervisor’s incentives requires more
detailed considerations, not knowing the exact number of low-quality applicants, j,
and hence the extent of actual bribery b∗(j,FA). Does our main intuition favoring
the principal’s use of a collusion-inducing program change? We like to think not,
though only further research can satisfactorily resolve this issue.
6 Conclusion
A well-known feature of cost-eﬀective control of corruption since Becker (1968) and
Becker and Stigler (1974) is optimal management of the trade-oﬀ between the level
of corruption and the resources spent on enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.
While keeping this feature present in our model, we focused on the choice between
preventing and allowing, or even encouraging, collusion within public organization
hierarchies. This choice depends on the nature of penalties, that is, the extent to
which penalties on detected corrupt oﬃcials take the form of nonmonetary sanc-
tions. Though in some public organizations collusion can generate the beneﬁt of
avoiding the problem of double-marginalization as noted by Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), its beneﬁts in our setup stem from economizing on rewarding of enforce-
ment eﬀorts as well as avoiding the costs of preventing collusion under nonmonetary
sanctions. Just how signiﬁcant are nonmonetary sanctions as a fraction of the over-
all penalty on corrupt oﬃcials is an empirical question and the answer would no
doubt vary across jurisdictions.
23Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i) follows from the deﬁnitions of k∗(FA) and x(FA).
Part (ii) follows from continuity of the expressions on both sides of (4) with respect
to x(FA).
That k∗(FA) is decreasing and continuous in FA are straightforward. To show
that x(FA) is increasing in FA, suppose not. Let FA be increased from f to f0.
Clearly, x(f0) = x(f) is impossible because the R.H.S. of (4) will be increased
while the L.H.S. will remain unchanged, contradicting part (ii). Suppose, then,
x(f0) < x(f). By deﬁnition of x(f0) we have
x(f





0) · z > [α + (1 − α)r(x(f
0))]f.
Then we can decrease x(f0) slightly to some ˜ x so that
˜ x · z > [α + (1 − α)r(˜ x)]f,
which contradicts the deﬁnition of x(f). Hence, x(f0) ≥ x(f). Combining with the
fact that x(f0) = x(f) is impossible establishes our claim, x(f0) > x(f).
Continuity of x(FA) is straightforward. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the incentive compatibility constraint (5) is not
binding for the cost-minimizing incentives chosen by the principal; for this lemma
we leave FA unspeciﬁed as the argument holds for any FA chosen by the principal.
If both pS > 0 and FS > 0, the principal is able to lower pS and FS slightly
without violating (5) or (6), which will lower costs25 – a contradiction. If pS = 0
and FS > 0 so that wS > 0 to satisfy the participation constraint, the principal
can lower FS and wS slightly to lower the overall costs, again a contradiction. If
pS > 0 and FS = 0, the principal can lower pS slightly and satisfy both the incentive
compatibility constraint and the participation constraint; this will lower the overall
costs, again a contradiction.
25It is suﬃcient to choose ∆pS < 0 and ∆FS < 0, both very small in magnitudes, such that





















To minimize total costs the principal must set wS =
P
j≥x(FA) ncjqj(1 − q)n−jαFS,
and total costs are:
















Now consider total costs if FS = 0 and pS is chosen to bind (5), that is,
P
j≥x(FA) ncjqj(1 − q)n−jr(b∗(j))pS = η. Observe that the participation constraint
is now automatically satisﬁed (with equality) by choosing wS = 0. This mechanism
yields the total cost







which is lower than TC0. Therefore FS cannot be positive.
Since wS does not aﬀect supervision eﬀort and appears as a cost item in the
principal’s objective (1), it is optimal to set w∗
S = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. We provide only an heuristic argument. Because in the
optimal mechanism the supervisor’s eﬀort incentive constraint (5) must be binding
and F ∗
S = 0 (Lemma 2), the supervisor’s expected rewards is always set equal to
η by appropriate choice of pS. Thus, FA aﬀects the principal’s cost objective only
through the expected social costs associated with agent’s optimal bribe solicita-
tion strategy b∗(j). Since b∗(j) is (weakly) decreasing in FA, overall costs will be
minimized by setting F ∗
A = F.26 Q.E.D.
26More precisely, an increase in FA will lower the expected social costs if it induces a suﬃciently
large increase in the bribe trigger x(FA) and a fall in the interior optimal number of bribes k∗(FA)
so that for at least some j values (the number of low-quality applicants) the agent switches from
soliciting j bribes to no bribe at all, while for large j turnouts the agent ﬁnds it optimal to accept
a smaller number of bribes. See Figure 1.
25Proof of Proposition 2. The set of feasible incentives under collusion-proofness is
a proper subset of the feasible incentives in the absence of collusion. Therefore the
principal’s expected overall costs under collusion-proof incentives cannot decrease.
To show that the costs would strictly increase, consider the following two mutually
exclusive cases under the optimal CP-mechanism: (A) F CP
A < F; (B) F CP
A =
F. In case (A), bCP(j) > b∗(j) (assuming the agent’s bribe solicitation is strictly
decreasing in the penalty FA) would increase social costs of corruption with no
reduction in expected enforcement cost for the principal (because (6) will have
to be satisﬁed), thus pushing up the overall costs. In case (B), pCP




S, which implies either pCP
S > p∗
S or F CP
S > F ∗
S (or both): since
bCP(j) = b∗(j), the ﬁrst clearly increases the expected enforcement cost for the
principal and thus the overall costs; the latter implies F CP
S > 0, so to satisfy the
participation constraint in (6) the expected enforcement cost must again strictly
exceed η, pushing up the overall costs. We verify below the remainder of the
proposition.
[i] wCP
A = 0 follows by the same reasoning as in the (*)-mechanism. That wCP
S =
0 follows from the observation that the principal will do no worse by adjusting pS
rather than setting wS positive to satisfy (6); adjusting pS rather than wS has the
additional beneﬁt of facilitating ICC and CPC.
[ii] First we claim that in the optimal CP-mechanism at least one of the two
constraints – CPC and ICC – must bind. Suppose not so that (7) and (5) both hold
with strict inequality; the participation constraint (6) may hold with or without
equality. Let us maintain FA at its optimal CP-level so that bCP(j) is unaﬀected.
Consider now two cases: (1) both pCP
S > 0 and F CP
S > 0; (2) pCP
S > 0 and
F CP
S = 0.27 In case (1), lower both pS and FS slightly in the same way as in
Lemma 2 (see footnote 25) so that the constraints (5) and (6) are satisﬁed. The
collusion-proofness constraint (7) is satisﬁed because the changes in pS and FS are
small. Overall, the principal’s costs fall because pS is smaller, contradicting the
optimality of the proposed solution. In case (2), because ICC is non-binding and
F CP
S = 0, the participation constraint (6) must be holding with strict inequality.
So if pS is lowered slightly, the principal’s expected costs will fall while all three
constraints (5), (6) and (7) continue to be satisﬁed, a contradiction.
27The third case, pCP
S = 0, FCP
S > 0, does not arise as it violates (6).
26Now we show that, in fact, the CPC would always bind. Suppose not, so that
pCP
S +αF CP
S > (1−α)F CP












S ) = η.
Also, it must be that F CP
A = F. Suppose not. Then FA can be increased to induce
a fall in bCP(j,FA), and an appropriate increase in pS will keep ICC binding. As
a result, the principal’s overall costs will fall (on balance enforcement costs remain
unchanged while social costs are lowered), contradicting the optimality of the CP-
mechanism. Therefore, F CP
A = F, bCP(j,F CP












S < (1 − α)F,
which contradicts collusion-proofness (the ﬁrst equality follows from the ICC being
binding under the optimal CP-mechanism). Hence, the CPC must be binding.
[iii] Suppose 0 ≤ F CP
S < F and the participation constraint does not bind. Then
maintaining F CP
A unchanged (so that bribery equals bCP(j)), lower pS (which must
be positive because wCP
S = 0) by a small  > 0 and correspondingly increase FS
by /α. These adjustments leave pS +αFS unchanged and thus would satisfy both
(7) and (5). Also, in the supervisor’s participation constraint (6) the change in the
bracketed term under summation can be expressed as r(·)·(∆pS)−(1−r(·))α(∆FS),
which is −. Since  is small, (6) will not be violated. Given bCP(j) unchanged, the
modiﬁcation above reduces the principal’s overall costs in (1), contradicting that
the original CP-conﬁgurations were optimal. Hence (6) must be binding.
Now it is easy to verify that the principal should substitute away from the direct
rewards pS and rely on the penalty FS to the extent possible (while satisfying (6)) if
the supervisor is going to earn a positive rent; this adjustment lowers enforcement
costs and total costs.
[iv] We claim that, if F CP
S = 0 then F CP
A < F. To show this, suppose F CP
S = 0
but F CP
A = F. By part [iii], the participation constraint (6) must bind, implying,
given wCP






j≥x(F) ncjqj(1 − q)
n−j · r(bCP(j))
.
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S = (1 − α)F,
contradicting p∗
S < (1 − α)F, thus establishing our claim.
From the above claim it also follows that, if F CP
A = F then F CP
S > 0.
Therefore, it must be that either F CP
A < F or F CP
S > 0.28
[v] Finally, it is easy to see, given the result in part [iii], that when F CP
S = F the
supervisor may have to be given a rent which the principal cannot capture under
the limited liability (i.e, non-negative wages) assumption. That the agent may have
to be given a rent follows from our analysis of the honest supervisor case in section
3.1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since the agent gets a nonnegative expected payoﬀ in any
equilibrium where he is induced to take a positive number of bribes, the principal
sets wBH
A = 0.
Next we show that F BH
S = 0. Under the BH-scheme, the supervisor’s incentive
compatibility constraint is given by (8), which is independent of FS. However, the
penalty FS appears in the supervisor’s participation constraint (9). If (9) is not
binding and FS > 0, the principal can set FS = 0 at no additional cost, because
FS appears nowhere else in the principal’s problem, including the objective cost
function. If (9) is binding and FS > 0, again, setting FS = 0 brings in no additional
cost and does not violate any constraint; it will, however, strictly decrease costs if, in
addition, wS > 0: then FS and wS can both be decreased suitably without violating
the supervisor’s participation constraint, which reduces the wage bill, hence, costs.
Given the result F BH
S = 0, observe that if the supervisor’s incentive compati-
bility constraint (8) holds, the participation constraint stated above will also hold
for any wS ≥ 0. Therefore wBH
S = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that while p∗
S < (1 − α)F so that the (*)-
mechanism is not collusion-proof, by deﬁnition the conﬁgurations (p∗
S,w∗
S = 0,F ∗
S =
28That both possibly may hold can be understood from the diﬀerent cost implications of the two
alternatives: positive FS involves deadweight loss for which the supervisor must be adequately
compensated (his participation constraint must be satisﬁed), whereas lowering of FA would in-
crease both enforcement costs as well as social costs of corruption; these two types of cost increases
may be such that to balance the principal may compromise little bit in both directions.
280,F ∗
A = F) satisfy the supervisor’s incentive compatibility and participation con-
straints, respectively (5) and (6).
Under the BH-mechanism, the “reward” the supervisor expects from detecting
bribery is (1 − α)FA (by Lemma 4, F BH
S = 0). Setting FA = F maximizes the
(indirect) reward and at the same time minimizes bribery through (3). Then the
agent’s strategy is bBH(j,F) = b∗(j,F) ≤ b∗(j,F CP
A ) = bCP(j,F CP
A ). Given (1 −
α)F > p∗
S, the supervisor’s incentive compatibility constraint (8) (the modiﬁed
version of (5)) is satisﬁed for bBH(j,F) = b∗(j,F). Also, given wBH
S = 0 by Lemma
4, the participation constraint (9) (the modiﬁed version of (6)) is satisﬁed.
Since the principal incurs no direct reward costs under the BH-mechanism
(which are incurred under both the (*)-mechanism and the CP-mechanism) and
wBH
A = 0 (by Lemma 4), compared to the CP-mechanism total expected costs will
fall by at least η, and may even fall further if bBH(j,F) < bCP(j,F CP
A ). Q.E.D.
References
[1] Banerjee, A.V., 1997. A theory of misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 112, 1289-1332.
[2] Bardhan, P., 1997. Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal
of Economic Literature 35, 1320-1346.
[3] Basu, K., Bhattacharya, S., and Mishra, A., 1992. Notes on bribery and the
control of corruption. Journal of Public Economics 48, 349-359.
[4] Becker, G., 1968. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal
of Political Economy 76, 169-217.
[5] Becker, G. and Stigler, G.J., 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance and the
compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19.
[6] Besley, T. and McLaren, J., 1993. Taxes and bribery: The role of wage
incentives. Economic Journal 102, 119-141.
[7] Hindriks, J., Keen, M. and Muthoo, A., 1999. Corruption, extortion and
evasion. Journal of Public Economics 74, 395-430.
29[8] Itoh, H., 1993. Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing. Journal of Economic
Theory 60, 410-427.
[9] Kessler, A.S., 2000. On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies. Journal of
Economic Theory 91, 280-291.
[10] Klitgaard, R., 1988. Controlling corruption. University of California Press,
Berkeley.
[11] Kofman, F. and Lawarr´ ee, J., 1993. Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econo-
metrica 61, 629-656.
[12] Kofman, F. and Lawarr´ ee, J., 1996. On the optimality of allowing collusion.
Journal of Public Economics 61, 383-407.
[13] Laﬀont, J.J. and Tirole, J., 1991. The politics of government decision mak-
ing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1089-1127.
[14] Marjit, S. and Shi, S., 1998. On controlling crime with corrupt oﬃcials.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 163-172.
[15] Mookherjee, D. and Png, I., 1995. Corruptible law enforcers: How should
they be compensated? Economic Journal 105, 145-159.
[16] Olsen, T.E. and Torsvik, G., 1998. Collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies:
A case of beneﬁcial corruption. International Economic Review 39, 413-438.
[17] Shleifer, R. and Vishny, A., 1994. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics
[18] Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in
organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181-214.
[19] Tirole, J., 1992. Collusion and the theory of organizations. In: J.J. Laf-
font, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress 2, 151-206,





























            0                        x(FA)                                k*(FA)                                                j 
 
 
Figure 1: The agent’s bribe solicitation strategy as a function of the 
number of low-quality applicants given the penalty FA. 
 